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The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A




In The Rise and Fall of Article 2,' Robert Scott presents several
positive theses concerning the effect of the political economy of the
drafting and revision of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
on (a) the nature of the default provisions in the statute, (b) thejudicial interpretation of express contract terms, and (c) private
contracting behavior. A core thesis was developed with Alan
Schwartz in an earlier article.2 It suggests that the original drafting of
Article 2 occurred in an environment in which no interest group
dominated and the drafters were predominantly academics with policy
goals that diverged from the more conservative views of the median
member of the private legislature, the ALI-NCCUSL. The drafters
were inclined to propose vague standards instead of clear rules in
order to increase the likelihood of adoption of their draft statute.
Standards obtain much of their content from their subsequent
application by courts to specific facts. Schwartz and Scott argue that
their prediction is borne out by the vague provisions in Article
2-indeed, quite clearly so.' The adoption of these vague provisions
resulted, therefore, not from their intrinsic merits, but from the
political conditions the authors identify.4 In The Rise and Fall, Scott
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Perre Bowen Professor and Horace W. Goldsmith Research Professor of
Law, University of Virginia. I am indebted to Chris Sanchirico for insights
generated during several discussions and I thank Eric Posner, Saul Levmore, Alan
Schwartz and Robert Scott for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. This
essay also benefitted from the discussion at the Louisiana Law Review Conference
held in honor of William D. Hawkland.
1. Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall ofArticle 2, 62 La. L. Rev. 1009 (2002)[hereinafter "Scott, Rise and Fall"].
2. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995) [hereinafter "Schwartz & Scott"].
3. "Because academics were and are in charge, we predict that both the
original Article 2 and the revisions will contain many vague rules. The former
prediction is confirmed on the face of the statute. Almost everyone who has studied
the subject agrees that the original Article 2 has many [vague] rules." Id. at 646.
Compare with Lawrence Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 St.
Louis L.J. 351, 355 (1969) ("Essentially, [the Uniform Commercial Code] was a
scheme of law professors, hungry for clarity and order in a tool of their trade.").
4. Scott, Rise and Fall, supra note 1, at 1010-11, 1041-42; Schwartz & Scott,
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reiterates this thesis and argues that private parties often prefer bright-
line legal rules to the vague terms in the Code.' These parties find it
cheaper to simply contract out of the defaults in Article 2 than to
lobby for clearer and more predictable default rules.' Scott observes
that the deficiencies of overly vague standards in Article 2 "may have
contributed to the decision by many commercial parties to abandon
Article 2 and its open-ended default rules in favor of more concrete,
privately devised alternatives." 7
The Schwartz/Scott thesis concerning Article 2 asserts that
political economy, rather than intrinsic policy merits, determined the
vagueness of the provisions. As persuasive as their theory may be, it
is unfortunately difficult to test. The theory of optimal vagueness,
or the optimal choice between rules and standards, has not evolved to
the point of producing a clear normative benchmark against which
Article 2 provisions maybe evaluated. Contract scholars and lawyers
undoubtedly have different views as to whether Article 2 provisions
are indeed more vague than optimal. To some, good faith and
commercial reasonableness are means to implement the intentions of
the parties to rely on ex post judicial determinations. To others, these
terms invite judges to rewrite contracts and create costly uncertainty
in commercial transactions.
An alternative test, suggested by Scott's analysis, compares the
degree of vagueness in Article 2 to the terms that sophisticated
commercial parties include in their contracts.9 Yet, vague terms are
supra note 2, at 615-21.
5. In Rise and Fall, Scott reiterates the argument made in previous works that
informal norms motivate contracting parties to cooperate in adjusting their
performance to changed circumstances and that "[a]ny effort to judicialize these
social and relational norms threatens to destroy the very informality and flexibility
that makes them so effective in the first instance." Scott, Rise and Fall, supra note
1, at 1041. In general, therefore, he proposes that commercial parties prefer to be
governed under separate regimes of bright-line legal default rules and flexible
relational norms that are not legally enforceable. See Scott, Rise and Fall, supra
note 1; Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal.
L. Rev. 2005 (1987); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597 (1990).
6. Scott, Rise and Fall, supra note 1, at 1014.
7. Id. at 1056.
8. One test would compare Article 2 with sales law in other jurisdictions in
which different legislative processes control. At first glance, it appears that vague
sales law default rules seem to be as common, if not more so, in the statutes of other
legal jurisdictions where private legislatures such as ALI-NCCUSL do not play a
role. Perhaps the key factor is the joint presence of academic drafters--or even
simply drafters with no economic interest in precision-and absence of dominant
interest group; private legislatures may not be a significant factor.
9. A third test compares Article 2 to the common law default rules, as Scott
has done in another work with respect to the interpretation of express terms. See
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also ubiquitous in commercial contracts. Although these contracts tend
to leave many terms to the discretion of one party (for example,
requirements or output contracts), vague expressions such as
"reasonableness," "good faith" and "best efforts" are very common in
commercial agreements. Indeed, in the foundational article on
relational contracts, Scott and Charles Goetz observe that "best efforts"
clauses are frequently used in a variety of contracts and the authors
prescribe the efficient judicial interpretation of this term.'" Given that
sophisticated and self-interested parties voluntarily agree to such vague
terms in their agreements, the preference of Article 2 reformers for
standards may simply reflect commercial practice in this regard."
The apparent willingness of commercial parties to agree to vague
terms is puzzling. The conventional view is that business entities avoid
the cost and risk of litigation. In this light, one would expect that
parties strive to reduce the uncertainty and cost of judicial
interpretation of their bargain-as well as the imposition of external
judicial values-by agreeing to the precise, bright-line rules that Scott
advocates. Several explanations of vague contract terms are consistent
with this view in that they attribute the vagueness we see in practice to
bounded rationality or agency problems in bargaining. For example,
when parties bargain through agents, the agents may shirk and thereby
leave obligations unspecified. Agents may also have higher discount
rates than their principals, preferring to avoid the risk of a deal-breaking
negotiation over a specific contingency and to accept instead the risk of
a protracted and uncertain litigation.
This comment begins a search for efficiency justifications for
vague terms in private contracts by examining the effect of
anticipated litigation activity on the drafting of substantive contract
Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative
Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in The Jurisprudential
Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt;
eds., 2000).
10. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles ofRelational Contracts, 67
Va. L. Rev. 1089, 1111 (1981). The authors urge the courts to interpret "best
efforts" in such a way as to induce efficient actions: that is, that maximize the joint
wealth of the parties. Scott appears to have since lost faith in the judiciary's ability
to follow this prescription, at least partly because the relevant variables tend to be
private information of the parties.
11. In some cases, efficient default terms might be even more vague than most
commercial parties would choose: if contracting from vague to precise terms (by the
majority) is substantially cheaper than contracting from precise to vague terms (by
the minority). This point is made in the context of corporate law by Ian Ayres. Ian
Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and
Fischel, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1391 (1992). He notes, for example, that the tendency
of courts to read private attempts to modify default obligations narrowly is likely
to be more pronounced when parties contract from precise to vague rules than when
they reject the muddy default rules for unconditional provisions. Id. at 1406.
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terms. Legal scholars have explored the impact of enforcement
constraints on the design of regulation: including, the choice between
rules and standards" and the value of accuracy in adjudication. 3 The
corresponding analysis is regrettably much more limited in contract
theory, where the focus has been on a simple conception of
verifiability: that contracting parties reject terms that are costly to
enforce, but seek to address specifically as many future contingencies
as may be feasibly distinguished by a future court.
Part II relates vagueness to verifiability by identifying three
features of vague terms: (a) the failure to fully exploit all verifiable
factors, (b) the inclusion of terms whose enforcement invokes non-
verifiable factors and (c) uncertainty as to the judicial weight assigned
to each among a set of bundled factors. Conventional wisdom
suggests that contracting parties should wish to avoid each of these
features. In contrast, Part III reviews some existing explanations for
the fact that contracts are often less complete than verifiability would
allow. Part IV advances a richer conception of verifiability based on
a signaling theory of litigation, 4 that suggests reasons why parties
would contract over terms that appear nonverifiable. Part V offers a
justification for the uncertainty in vague terms: it deters
overinvestment in evidence production or destruction.
II. THREE FEATURES OF VAGUENESS
In the economic analysis of contracts, the benchmark for contract
design (the first-best) is the complete contingent contract that
specifies the obligations of the parties in each possible future state of
the world. This contract ensures that each party makes the optimal
decision in each state. If a contract partitions future states less finely
by specifying the same obligations in more than one state, the contract
may fall short of providing optimal incentives in each state, and it is
called an incomplete contract.
Contract theory predicts that parties will avoid conditioning legal
obligations on actions or states that are not verifiable to a court and
a contract may be incomplete for this reason. 5 Yet, the theory also
12. E.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 1992
Duke L.J. 557.
13. E.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value ofAccuracy in Adjudication: An Economic.
Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307 (1994).
14. For another example of a signaling model of litigation, see Daniel L.
Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in
Judicial Proceedings, 18 Rand. J. Econ. 308 (1987).
15. A contract which is as complete as possible given these verification
constraints-that is, a contract that exploits all verifiable distinctions between
states-has been labeled functionally complete, or f-complete. Karen Eggleston,et
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expects contracting parties to complete their contract to the extent
allowed by this verification constraint.
The conception of verifiability in this literature is, however,
underdeveloped. Oliver Hart describes "verifiability" as follows:
The contract, 'I will pay you £1 million if you make the
investment i' is not enforceable, since no outsider knows
whether it has been fulfilled. Similarly, the parties' revenues
and costs cannot be made part of a profit-or cost-sharing
agreement. The quality of [my] book is observable, in the
sense that anybody can read it.... However, it would have
been difficult for Oxford University Press and me to have
written a contract making my royalties a function of quality,
since if a dispute arose it would be hard for either of us to
prove that the book did or did not meet some pre-specified
standard. (For this reason my royalties are made to depend on
some (more or less) verifiable consequences of quality, e.g.
sales.) In other words, quality is not verifiable. '
For convenience, Hart and other economists treat verifiability as
exogenous, binary and static: their models assume each category of
relevant fact to be either verifiable or not. However, the link between
verifiability and the difficulty or cost of proving a fact is at best
incomplete. After all, even a high enforcement cost might be justified
by a larger benefit in resulting efficiency of ex ante performance
incentives. Moreover, there are several reasons why verification costs
may not be incurred: the parties may settle their disputes or one party
may choose to capitulate rather than litigate. Finally, it is more
accurate to think about adjudication as an exercise in persuasion
rather than verification in the sense of proving truth. A fact need only
be proven on balance of probabilities and courts are in fact often
misled by false evidence.
Before elaborating these factors in Parts III and IV to produce a
richer conception of verifiability, I connect the economic concept of
verifiability to the vague contract terms with which this comment is
concerned. Vagueness may be defined by three distinct features.
First, a vague term partitions the future into fewer states of the world
than the relevant verifiable information would allow, and thus yields
a less complete contract. Second, a vague term permits parties to a
al, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 91, 101 (2000) [hereinafter"Eggleston, et al"]. Alan Schwartz calls this
contract endogenously incomplete because it stems from a conscious choice by the
parties to omit the nonverifiable factors. Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in
2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 278 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998).
16. Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure 37-38 n.15 (1995).
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subsequent dispute to spend resources attempting to persuade a court
of nonverifiable facts. Third, a vague term creates uncertainty with
respect to the factors, both verifiable or nonverifiable, a court may
find relevant in adjudicating a dispute, and the weight the court will
assign to each.
These three features are demonstrated by the following example
and illustration. A seller promises to deliver a good that has variable
quality. The contract might condition the price payable by the buyer
on some or all of the three attributes of the good: A, B and C. A and
B are verifiable attributes, while C is not verifiable. Consider four
possible contracts. (1) The contract sets four prices based on the
presence or absence of each of the verifiable attributes, A and B. The
buyer's obligation does not depend on the presence of C. This
contract is as complete as the verification constraints allow. (2) The
contract bases the price on only one of the verifiable attributes, A, and
the parties decide not to use the information from attribute B. This
contract is more incomplete than the first contract because it throws
away the information provided by the presence or absence of B. (3)
The contract conditions the price on the presence of C, even though
C cannot be proven to a court in a cost-effective manner. By this
action, the parties decide not to exclude evidence of C in any
subsequent court dispute. (4) The parties provide that each of A, B
and C are factors in the determination of the price, but they leave the
relative weight of each factor (ranging from zero to dispositive) to the
discretion of the enforcing third party. This fourth contract is a vague
term. It shares the properties of the second contract in that it does not
condition the buyer's obligation separately on each verifiable quality,
and of the third contract in that it does not exclude the introduction
of evidence concerning a relevant, but nonverifiable factor. The
vague contract also adds uncertainty as to the relevance or
significance of any given factor.
To use Oliver Hart's book as an illustration, the publishing
contract might condition the author's payment on any of three factors:
its sales over the first two years, the number of reviews of the book
in academic journals, and its contribution to knowledge. A vague
term, such as "high quality," does not distinguish between a bestseller
and a book that attracts the attention of academic journals, and is
therefore incomplete even as between verifiable states. It also admits
nonverifiable factors because it does not preclude attempts by another
party in a subsequent dispute to introduce evidence as to the
contribution of the book to the science of economics. Finally, there
is uncertainty as to which among the three factors a court will give the
most, or even exclusive, weight. The remainder of this comment
offers reasons why each of these three features may be efficient, thusjustifying the occasional use of vague terms.
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II. WHY CONTRACTS MAY NOT EXPLOIT ALL VERIFIABLE FACTORS
A number of explanations have been offered for the decision of
parties not to exploit some verifiable factors. First, the ex ante
transaction costs of specifying each possible verifiable future state of the
world-even if they can all be foreseen and contemplated-may exceed
the gains. 7 The parties may have more cost-effective means at their
disposal to address remote contingencies than legal enforcement of
complete contract terms. They may rely on renegotiation or on unilateral
discretion or adjustments, that in turn might be motivated by the norms
of their relationship, of their industry, or of their social environment.
When a party proposes that these norms of cooperation or trust be
supplanted by express legal terms, she may identify herself as someone
who does not feel bound by them. There is a distinct, but familiar,
additional constraint stemming from the utility individual parties derive
from participating in fair bargains that leads them to adjust the course of
performance to maintain a fair balance in changed circumstances.'" Yet,
when the gains from not cooperating exceed the sanctions within or
outside the relationship, these preferences or norms may not be sufficient
to discipline the behavior of the parties. As Eggleston, Posner, and
Zeckhauser explain: "The contract need deal only with states in which
the payoffs are very high, for it is in these states that the threat of
retaliation [or other extra legal sanctions] may not deter a party from
engaging in opportunism."' 9
Other explanations suggest that, when information is asymmetric
between the parties, the better-informed party may refrain from
proposing a more complete contract because, in doing so, she may
communicate private information to the other party and thereby
compromise her share of the contracting surplus. For example, the buyer
may have private information about her high valuation of a good in a
given state which might be revealed when she asks for a substantial
warranty in that state. Also, a seller's urging for a cost-plus contract may
reflect her better-than-average ability to manipulate accounting records.20
17. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and
Renegotiation, 56 Econometrica 755 (1988).
18. In a recent paper, Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein, and Klaus M. Schmidt show
that where a sufficient portion of the population is fair-minded, a contract that relies
on the discretion of one or both parties (e.g. the principal decides whether to give
the agent a bonus ex post) yields better incentives than a more complete contract
because a detailed contract restricts the ability of one party to retaliate against non-
cooperative behavior of the other. Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klein, & Klaus Schmidt,
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness (Mar. 2001) (CESifo
Working Paper No. 445).
19. Eggleston, et al, supra note 15, at 116.
20. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Measurement Distortion and Missing
Contingencies in Optimal Contracts, 2 Economic Theory 1 (1992). See also
2002] 1071
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Another constraint on contracting specifically over verifiable
factors is known as the agency problem of multitasking. If there are
a number of dimensions to an agent's product, some verifiable and
others not, then conditioning reward on the measurable dimension
distorts the agent's efforts toward the dimension on which
compensation is based, and away from nonverifiable features. The
important premise in this argument is that the agent might have
pursued otherwise the nonmeasureable dimension because of an
external benefit, such as personal satisfaction or reputation.2'
Multitasking has a related selection effect-by drawing attention to
the verifiable component, the contract attracts parties less concerned
with the non-verifiable qualities.22
Even if there are a host of good reasons for contracts that do not
exploit all verifiable information, few, if any, justifications have been
advanced for the second and third features of vague rules: namely, the
open door to nonverifiable factors and the uncertainty as to the weight
of each factor. Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that parties should
not condition obligations on non-verifiable factors23 and that they
should avoid the risk associated with the judicial interpretation of
their express terms. Yet, the common use of vague terms contradicts
this prescription and raises the puzzle of why parties employ them.
To be sure, there are some relatively simple but incomplete
explanations. The parties may use a vague term to communicate
Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 Rand. J. Econ. 432
(1992).
21. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J. L. Econ. & Org. 24(1991); George Baker, Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement, 100 J.
Pol. Econ. 598 (1992); B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete
Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 902 (1998).
22. As noted at the end of Part I, contracting parties might be able to convert
a nonverifiable feature into a verifiable one by referring to the judgment of a third
party arbiter within the industry. For example,[i]t is difficult to imagine an occupation for which there are more measures
of performance [than baseball]. Despite this, it is not common for players
to have contracts where pay is directly related to specific performance
measures. Part of the reason for this is that teams are reluctant to offer a
contract that rewards a player for home runs, say, because the player may
have an incentive to hit home runs even when it is not in the interest of the
team for him to do so. By contrast, the more common cases where players
are offered explicit bonuses are for aggregate measures of performance,
such as making the All Star Team or being the league's Most Valuable
Player. Since these are more holistic measures of performance, they suffer
less from the multi-tasking dilemma.
Canice Prendergast, The Provision of Incentives in Firms, 37 J. Econ. Lit. 7, 22
(Mar. 1999) (italics in the original).
23. Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271 (1992).
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intentions and expectations to each other, or even to their own co-
workers or agents, rather than to a future arbiter or court. For
example, a manager of the selling firm may be anxious to avoid the
relational or reputational loss from supplying substandard goods to
the buyer. It may be easier to communicate to subordinates the
importance of performance by pointing to a contract term, albeit
vague, than by referring to potential relational or reputational harm.
However, by using their contract to do so, the parties cannot bind
themselves against raising these terms in future litigation. Therefore,
this puzzle calls for an analysis that endogenizes verifiability. The
next two Parts offer a richer conception of verifiability by introducing
a strategic theory of evidence management to the problem of contract
design.
IV. A SIGNALING THEORY OF VERIFIABILITY
Verifiability should contemplate several factors beyond the cost
of proving to a court a relevant fact. At a minimum, the cost of
verifying a fact should be compared to the incentive gain yielded by
the contractual provision that relies on this fact. For example, a fact
is verifiable if the cost of proving it to a court is less than the gain in
the ex ante performance incentives. Thus, even a high evidentiary
cost may be outweighed by a larger incentive gain from more
complete contracting. Conversely, a relatively easily proven factor
may be nonverifiable if contracting separately on that factor effects
an insignificant improvement in incentives.
Verification costs are at least partly within the control of the
parties by virtue of their choice among contract terms and their
actions during the term of the contract and any future dispute. For
example, factors that are nonverifiable before a judicial court maybe
verifiable to a specialized arbiter. Vague terms such as "reasonable"
may have a more precise meaning to an arbiter than a judge, and can
therefore police a larger range of conduct. In addition, the parties
may tailor the procedural rules in future arbitrations to further reduce
verification costs. Arbitration, however, has its disadvantages and
there are limits to the parties' ability to precommit to dispute
resolution procedures.
Verification costs depend also on the parties' decisions during the
adjudicatory process. If the parties settle their dispute, these costs
will be only partly incurred, if at all. I set aside this prospect to focus
on the possibility that, even without settlement, one or the other party
may not find it worth its while to sue or defend. The cost of verifying
a relevant fact therefore depends on the path of the litigation game the
parties will play. In game theoretic jargon, we should initially focus
our attention on enforcement costs incurred along the equilibrium
2002] 1073
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path. At various junctures, each party decides whether to offer no
evidence, true evidence or false evidence. The system of adjudication
appears to be quite tolerant of false evidence: perjury charges are
rarely brought and the structure of burdens of proof often create very
large incentives to meet the threshold by lying about some facts.
Suppose that a contract provides for the sale of a widget at a price
of $10. The value of the widget to the buyer is $13. The cost to the
seller is unknown when the contract is signed, but in two states of the
world,24 the costs are $12 or $14, respectively. Delivery is efficient
when the cost is $12 because the value to the buyer is $13. However,
delivery is not efficient when the cost is $14. Therefore, the parties
may contract that the seller is excused from its obligation to deliver
when its cost is $14. In a world of perfect enforcement, this would
yield efficient incentives to perform and breach. Although the
contract obliges the seller to deliver when the cost is $12, the trade is
a losing proposition for the seller in this state and she would therefore
like to avoid her obligation to deliver by arguing that her costs are
$14. I assume that she can persuade the court through fabricated
evidence at some cost. The following signaling analysis demonstrates
that the decision of the parties to distinguish contractually between
the two states ($12 cost versus $14 cost) depends not simply on the
verification cost, but on the relationship between this cost and the
threatened gains or losses from performance.
If the seller in the example succeeds in persuading the court to
excuse her performance, she avoids a $2 loss if her costs are $12 and
a $4 loss if her costs are $14. It follows that, if her cost of persuasion
is more than $4, she will not make this investment and will instead
perform (or pay damages) even when her costs are actually $14. The
state is not verifiable in this case because the seller will not find it in
her interest to incur the cost of proving it.25 Suppose instead that the
seller can convince the court that her costs are $14 by spending an
amount less than $2 on evidence, even when her costs are in fact $12.
Then, the seller will be excused whether her costs are $12 or $14. In
this case, the parties would not find it in their interest to distinguish
between the two states in their contract because the seller would be
excused in either state. Therefore, the contract should distinguish
between the states only if the cost of truthfully establishing the excuse
state is less than $4 and the cost offalsely establishing it is more than
$2. Indeed, it is interesting that there need not be a difference in the
24. Note that there are other states. For the contract to be profitable to the
seller, the average cost among all states must be lower than $10. However, the
example concerns only the distinction between two of the unprofitable states.
25. This analysis assumes an American fee-rule in which losing litigants do not
reimburse the winners for any part of their litigation costs.
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cost of establishing the excuse state truthfully or falsely. If the cost
is $3 in each state, only the seller with cost of $14 will raise the
defense; the $12 seller will not find it worth her while.
A similar analysis may be applied to the buyer's incentives to
present evidence of the realized state of the world. The important
parameter in this analysis is the buyer's gain from performance (as
opposed to the seller's loss). The buyer will persuade the court of the
existence of the $12-cost state only if the cost of doing so is less than
$3. Therefore, accurate costing will occur only if truthful evidence
costs less than $3 and false evidence costs more than $3.
The analysis may also be adjusted to accommodate a more
complicated adjudicatory process. For example, the litigation game
may involve alternating actions by each party corresponding to
shifting burdens of persuasion. Consider the following stylized form
of litigation. After the buyer brings an action for breach of contract,
the seller may present sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case
for excuse, and thereby shift the burden on the buyer to show that
excuse is not available. The buyer may then invest to rebut the prima
facie case and throw the burden of proof back on the seller. The
seller then decides whether to spend the amount necessary to prove
the fact to the court on the balance of probabilities.
Suppose that the seller can spend $1 to make the prima facie case
that her costs are $14, whether or not this is true. The seller may
make this expenditure to avoid the greater loss from performance in
either state. However, the buyer may increase the seller's verification
cost by introducing contradictory evidence and shifting the burden of
proof back to the seller. Suppose that by spending $2 on evidence,
the buyer can force the seller to incur an additional $5 to meet her
burden of proof. Anticipating the buyer's action before making the
prima facie case, the seller will not find it worth her total investment
of $6- to prove performance costs of $14 and will simply perform
rather than trigger litigation. Thus, the state of the world in which
delivery cost is $14 is not verifiable because it is not in the seller's
interest to prove it. The seller will therefore not value this excuse
from performance, and the parties will not distinguish between the
states in their contract.
Now, suppose instead that it costs the buyer $4 to shift the burden
of proof back to the seller. The buyer's threat in this case is not
credible because the buyer would not spend $4 to enforce a contract
that yields a profit to her of only $3. Therefore, the seller can win on
her prima facie case. The seller therefore values the contracting term
excusing her performance when her delivery cost is $14 and the
parties are likely to distinguish between the states. Note, however,
that the aggregate expense of litigation, if it were to occur, would be
higher in this example than the former one. The lesson to be drawn
2002] 1075
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from these examples is that the parties' incentives to complete their
contract is determined by their verification expense if it lies on the
equilibrium path. Therefore, if the buyer's cost of shifting the burden
onto the seller is more than the value of performance ($3), the state
is contractible even though it is not verifiable. If it is less than $3, the
bad state is neither verifiable nor contractible because the high cost
of verification lies on the equilibrium path. The seller may strive to
avoid its obligations under either state because the cost of
performance outweighs the price.
As a general proposition, a party's evidentiary burden is easier to
meet when the truth is on his side. Therefore, the buyer's cost of
rebutting the seller's prima facie case is likely to be lower if the seller
is misrepresenting her cost as $14 than if the cost is truly $14.
Suppose that the cost to the buyer of rebutting the prima facie case is
$2 when it is false and $4 when it is true. The foregoing illustration
suggests that the seller will attempt to prove its cost as $14 only when
it is true. Therefore, the parties will contract ex ante on the state of
the world even though it would be costly to verify. An analogous
argument applies to cases in which the seller's cost of proving its
case, although high, differs substantially depending on whether its
assertion is true or not. Therefore, as a general matter, commercial
parties might contract on factors that are not verifiable if there is a
sufficiently significant difference in the cost of proving or rebutting
a truthful versus a false representation of the state of the world.
V. EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT AND AN INCENTIVE BENEFIT FROM
UNCERTAINTY
A promisor has the choice to perform her contractual obligation
or to not perform and suffer the sanctions for breach. Once the
process of adjudication is added to the analysis, the promisor has a
third option: to not perform and to invest in persuading the court that
she has not breached (for example, because performance is excused
under the contract). For ease of reference, I will refer to this
investment as evidence management. An increase in the sanctions for
breach might increase the incentive to perform, but it might also
increase the incentive to breach and invest in evidence management.
Consider the following standard economic contract model. The
parties contract at to for the sale of a good at a specified price;
delivery and payment are due at t2 and these obligations are
specifically enforced. At t1, one or both parties may make an
investment that is specific to the contract and increases the value
of the trade at t2 (if trade occurs). There is uncertainty and, at both
to and t,, each party only knows the distribution of the cost to the
seller of delivering the good and the value of the good to the buyer
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at t2 . The cost and value are functions of the state of the world that
materializes at t2 and the specific investments made at t,. At t, the
parties decide whether to trade or not, depending on the outcome of these
variables and the terms of their contract.
I-----------------I--- --
to t, t2
contract specific investment performance (or not)
There is a parallel time line concerning the dispute resolution
strategies of the parties in the event that the contract becomes
unprofitable to either party (whether or not trade is efficient). For
example, if the contract excuses the seller's performance in some states,
the sellermay choose to prove one of these states if trade is unprofitable
to her, whether or not it is true. This requires the seller to incur evidence
cost at t2 . Where this cost of persuasion is less than the cost of
performance, the seller will not perform, whether or not an excuse state
actually exists.
Moreover, the technology of evidence production may permit
investment at t, that lowers evidence costs ("evidence investment"),
much as the standard economic contracts literature provides that specific
investment at t, can reduce the cost of delivering the good at t2 ("specific
investment"). Indeed, the evidence investment and specific investment
are related strategically-sometimes as complements and at others as
substitutes. For example, a seller who is worried that her delivery cost
might exceed the contract price can choose between investing to reduce
the cost of the trade or investing to reduce the cost of evidence
production in order to avoid its obligation to trade. Investment in
evidence includes, for example, the creation of records or the sponsoring
of research that will support future expert testimony. Significantly, it
might also entail the destruction of prejudicial evidence that the buyer
might find in discovery. Like evidence production, destruction entails a
cost-not only the physical act of destruction but also the loss of other
private uses of the information. In either case, the investment lowers the
cost of the seller's attempt at t to avoid trade.
I ---
to t, t2contract evidence investment performance or
evidence production
Each party weighs the marginal cost of evidence investment
against the marginal expected benefit-the reduction in the cost of
2002] 1077
8LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
evidence production at t2 discounted by both the likelihood of no
trade and the importance of the relevant factor in future litigation. At
t , the seller's delivery costs are determined, and the seller decides
whether to trade or to claim an excuse. As noted in Part IV, the
production of evidence at that time contributes to efficient screening
by the court between states in which trade is efficient and in which it
is not. At t,, however, there is uncertainty as to whether trade will or
will not be efficient. As before, assume that the parties litigate if the
seller chooses not to deliver. The seller has the incentive to
overinvest in evidence at t, compared to the social optimum. For
example, if the seller's cost appears to be substantially greater than
the contract price at t, (the seller's stake is substantially out of the
money), the seller may be motivated to invest in evidence rather than
in reducing the cost of delivery. This is inefficient if the expected
cost of delivery is less than the expected value to the buyer (even
though the cost exceeds the contract price). The seller does not
internalize the benefit from specific investment because anyreduction
in the cost of delivery enures to the benefit of the buyer. In contrast,
evidence investment lowers the expected cost to the seller of avoiding
the contract and the seller captures this benefit. The buyer, however,
anticipates the seller's bias in favor of evidence investment by
increasing her own investment in evidence at t,. This reinforces the
seller's overinvestment in evidence and might contribute to an
escalation of inefficient investment at t,. If so, the parties' joint
interest at the time of contracting is to correct these incentives for
evidence overinvestment.
The parties are unlikely to be able to contract as to the amount of
evidence production because it is not verifiable.: Uncertainty in the
factors that excuse trade, however, can dampen the incentives for
overinvestment in evidence. Compare contracts with certain and
uncertain excuse terms. The precise contract excuses trade if any of
a number of specified states of the world materialize. At t1, the seller
will determine which states will be the least costly to prove at t2 given
the information at t,, and will invest in the production of evidence
supporting the existence of those states. In contrast, the uncertain
contract excuses trade on the basis of a term that encompasses several
states of the world, but that leaves it to the discretion of the future
court to determine which factor or state is dispositive. At t,, the seller
must discount the benefit from evidence investment with respect to
any given state by the probability that the court will choose that given
state at t2. As a result, the expected benefit from evidence investment
with respect to a given state is lower in the uncertain contract than in
the precise contract. Thus, uncertain terms may be efficient because
they correct for overinvestment in evidence by reducing the expected
private benefit.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Vague terms are characterized by three features: (a) they decline
to exploit verifiable distinctions; (b) they decline to exclude recourse
to nonverifiable factors in future litigation; and (c) they leave tojudicial discretion the weight to be assigned to various verifiable and
nonverifiable factors. This comment explains that there are efficient
reasons why commercial parties may invoke each of these three
features and, consequently, why they may rationally agree to vague
terms in their contracts. Whether the default rules in Article 2 of the
U.C.C. are more vague than what most parties would agree to is an
open question deserving closer examination. In the absence of further
inquiry into private preferences for vagueness, one cannot explain the
Article's vague terms as the result of the peculiar political economic
environment of its drafting and enactment.

